Abstract
A growing body of theoretical and empirical research indicates that the ability of firms to access banking finance fosters average growth.
1 For example, Rajan and Zingales (1998) find that industries that depend on external financing for investment grow faster in countries with larger banking systems. In addition to its positive effect on average growth, access to banking finance may have an important effect on growth volatility.
The effect of financial markets-and banking finance in particular-on volatility is less well understood. This paper studies the relationship between banking integration and the volatility of the corporate sector using data on publicly-traded U.S. firms.
From a macroeconomic point of view, volatility is important because of the growth benefits conferred by stability (Ramey and Ramey (1995) , Aghion et al. (2005) ). From the point of individual corporations, volatility is important because stable firms face lower expected costs from financial distress (Smith and Stulz (1985) ), financial policies are more effective for solving agency problems in stable firms (Stulz (1990) ), and investors value firms with smooth cash flows at a premium (Rountree, Weston, and
Allayannis (2008)).
2
In theory, the direction of the effect of banking finance on firm volatility is ambiguous. On the one hand, wider access to external finance may increase the ability of firms to offset idiosyncratic shocks, thus reducing firm volatility. On the other hand, wider access to external finance may promote specialization and allow firms to pursue riskier and more profitable projects (Thesmar and Thoenig (2009) ), thus increasing firm volatility. As a consequence of mutually offsetting forces, the net effect of access to banking finance on firm volatility is an empirical question.
3
Recent papers in this area suggest that wider access to banking finance may lower volatility in the corporate sector. Extending the methodology of Rajan and Zingales (1998), Larrain (2006) finds that growth in industries that depend on external finance is less volatile in countries with more bank credit relative to GDP. Using a similar crosscountry, cross-industry approach, Raddatz (2006) argues that the volatility-reducing effect of more bank intermediation results partly from the role of the financial system in 1 See Levine (2005) for a survey. 2 The existence of corporate hedging activity suggests that firms try to mitigate some sources of risk and volatility. See, for example, Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) . 3 In addition, the effect of wider access to banking finance on volatility may depend on the relative strength of credit supply and credit demand shocks (Morgan, Rime, and Strahan (2004) ).
providing liquidity. 4 Cross-country studies results may also be consistent with a reverse causality interpretation, where a more stable corporate sector facilitates the expansion of bank credit.
This paper complements and refines the findings in Larrain (2006) and Raddatz (2006) by using a different identification strategy for isolating the effect of banking finance on corporate volatility. In particular, we use a differences-in-differences approach that exploits the staggered timing of interstate banking deregulation across U.S.
states during the 1980s and early 1990s to estimate the effect of banking integration on firm-level volatility. After a state passed an interstate banking deregulation law, out-ofstate banks were allowed to acquire banks incorporated in that state, effectively promoting the integration of banking markets. We interpret deregulation that facilitates banking integration, starting from a situation with highly segmented markets, as promoting wider access to banking finance and improving efficiency in intermediation, possibly reflecting that financial institutions become more geographically diversified (Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) , Morgan, Rime, and Strahan (2004) ). With this interpretation, the results of this paper may inform the debate about the impact of access to banking finance on firm-level volatility.
Our identification strategy is similar to Morgan, Rime, and Strahan's (2004) , but we focus on firm volatility-as opposed to state volatility. Firm-level data help us in identifying banking deregulation as the driving force behind our results, because we are able to compare, within each state, the effect of deregulation on bank-dependent firms with the effect on non-bank-dependent firms. Previous research suggests that small firms and firms with limited access to corporate debt face significant asymmetries when accessing credit markets (Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) , Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) ). These types of firms tend to rely more heavily on banks for their external financing needs and are defined as bank dependent in our regression analysis.
We expect bank-dependent firms to be more sensitive to changes in banking conditions within a state.
We find that firms located in states that deregulate interstate banking exhibit a 4 In a related branch of the literature, Krozner, Laeven, and Klingebiel (2007) study the impact of banking crises across sectors depending on their degree of dependence on external finance.
reduction in the volatility of the growth rates of sales, production, cash flow, and employment after deregulation. In our main result, the reduction in volatility is likely to be associated with the changes in banking finance derived from deregulation, because it is concentrated on firms that are more likely to rely on banks for external financing. For example, firms without bond or commercial paper credit ratings or issues reduce their volatility after deregulation by more than firms with credit ratings or issues. Further tests suggest that firms exploit credit markets to smooth temporary cash-flow shocks, as shortterm credit becomes more countercyclical after deregulation (as in Larrain (2006)).
In addition, by using firm-level data we are able to examine the implications of wider access to banking finance for the volatility of individual stock returns. We document that the idiosyncratic volatility of stock returns falls after deregulation, particularly for firms that are a priori more likely to rely on banking finance. The residual variance of a market model of excess returns falls after deregulation for firms located in states that open to interstate banking. This finding is robust to adding the size and value factors of Fama and French (1993) and the momentum effect of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) .
At first glance, our results might seem at odds both with the increase in volatility of firm sales growth documented by Comin and Philippon (2005) and Comin and Mulani (2006) and with the increase in the idiosyncratic volatility of individual stock returns documented by Campbell et al. (2001) . While these papers describe aggregate trends over the second half of the twentieth century, we restrict our attention to the window of years around deregulation of interstate banking. Importantly, the increasing trend in volatility described by Comin and Philippon (2005) temporarily reverses during the 1980s-the years with the heaviest deregulation activity at the state level and, therefore, the main part of our sample. Similarly, the increasing trend in idiosyncratic volatility described by Campbell et al. (2001) does not apply to the 1980s. 5 In this paper, we abstract from aggregate trends in idiosyncratic volatility by controlling for year-fixed effects. We argue that part of the remaining variation in firm-level volatility is explained by interstate banking deregulation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I briefly reviews the interstate banking deregulation in the 1980s in the United States and summarizes some related studies. Section II presents our empirical methodology and the data. Section III shows the effect of banking deregulation on firm-level volatility and its differential impact on those firms that are more likely users of banking finance. This section also links volatility in operations and stock return volatility using multifactor models of stock returns at the firm level to isolate the idiosyncratic component of returns. Section IV concludes.
I. The Deregulation of Interstate Bank Entry
The The episode of banking deregulation in the 1980s and early 1990s changed the terms in which nonfinancial firms were able to access banking finance. In particular, Jayaratne 
II. Data and Methodology

A. Data
In the empirical analysis of this paper, we use balance sheet and income statement data extracted from the Compustat North-America database. Due to the sample selection criteria, an average firm stays in the sample for 17 years.
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[ 8 The earliest year for which we have location information comes after the first bank entry deregulation agreement was implemented (1982) . Although, some firms might have changed their location between these dates, the number is likely to be small. Using information from Compact Disclosure, we determine that less than 10 percent of firms covered by this database changed the state where they were headquartered between 1988 and 2005. 9 Due to this selection criterion, our results are explained by changes in the volatility of existing firms rather than changes in the volatility of entering and exiting firms. All results are robust to include firms that exit before deregulation and enter after deregulation. 10 We exclude firms headquartered in Delaware and South Dakota due to their incorporation and consumer finance regulations, respectively. In addition, as Hawaii did not deregulate before 1994, we also exclude firms located in that state. 11 The discontinuity at deregulation of our empirical design suggests that our results are not simply a reflection of firms becoming more stable as they age, and we conduct additional checks of our baseline results.
B. Firm Volatility
The effect of bank entry deregulation on firm volatility is ambiguous from a theoretical standpoint (Larrain (2006) , Morgan, Rime, and Strahan (2004)  . Notice that this measure of volatility is the absolute deviation of the firm's indicators from the overall trends in the economy, from the state where its headquarters are located, and from the industrial sector that represents its main activity. In addition, we allow for changes in the firms' growth rate after interstate bank entry is permitted.
The measure estimated from this empirical equation captures the idiosyncratic component of firms' volatility. Measuring volatility using absolute deviation (as opposed to squared deviations) implies that volatility and growth are conveniently expressed in the same units.
As part of their intermediation function, banks have a comparative advantage in providing liquidity to firms, particularly if the demand for funds is related to individual projects (Larrain (2006)). Therefore, to analyze the effect of banking deregulation on firm volatility, we will focus on its idiosyncratic component. In the second stage of our estimating procedure, we use the volatility measures defined in equation (1) 
We add two regressors, in addition to the set included in equation (1), to control for fluctuation at the state and industry level. Vol(Z jt ) and Vol(W kt ) are volatility proxies for the states' per capita income growth and real sales growth at the industry level, respectively.
In our baseline regressions, Y ijt is the growth rate of production, sales, cash flow, and employment, indicators of real corporate activity. These measures allow us to determine if output fluctuations changed after banking deregulation. 13 As in Larrain (2006), firm production is measured by inventory investments plus sales. In addition to this set of variables, we analyze the evolution of the firms' internal cash flow. Panel A in Table II shows summary statistics for the measures of volatility associated with these variables.
14 To test whether firm volatility decreases after interstate bank entry deregulation, we examine the sign of δ in equation (2). As documented by Comin and Mulani (2005) , the volatility of publicly-traded firms increased over the last five decades. The inclusion of time-fixed effects captures this secular trend. Therefore, a negative sign on the Integration coefficient is interpreted as a decrease in the upward trend in volatility.
We control for variation at the industry (W kt ) and state level (Z jt ) to isolate the effect of deregulation on the idiosyncratic component of firm-specific volatility. The former is measured by the absolute value of deviations of the log change in sales at the 3-digit SIC level, Vol(Industry Sales). 15 The state-level component is proxied by the volatility of log changes in per capita income, Vol(Per Capita Income). 16 Finally, selecting firms with observations before and after deregulation and controlling for firm-fixed effects alleviates sample biases in which firms that enter after deregulation exhibit a systematically different volatility than firms that exit before deregulation.
C. Firm Volatility and Bank Dependence
The baseline empirical estimation described in the previous section takes advantage of the staggered deregulation dates across states to identify whether there was a change in the firms' volatility measures explained by lower restrictions on out-of-state bank entry.
However, this strategy does not fully control for other potential shocks that might have had an effect on firms headquartered within the state at the time of banking deregulation.
We take this problem into account by using another layer of differentiation. In particular,
we test whether the effects of bank entry deregulation is stronger for bank-dependent firms, as opposed to firms with access to other sources of external financing, within each state.
We define two proxies for firms' Bank Dependence: one based on size and the other 15 Formally,
represents the volatility of the log change in Industry Sales, for each 3-digit SIC sector k. k Y is computed separately for the periods before and after bank entry deregulation.
based on the use of public corporate debt. These variables have been widely used in the financing constraints literature (e.g., Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) ).
Empirical studies typically find that small firms and firms with limited access to corporate debt face significant information asymmetries when accessing credit markets, 17 and thus rely more on the use of internal funds or on credit from banks to finance their operations. Dependence on internal funds and bank credit makes these firms more likely to experience a change in financing conditions due to interstate bank entry deregulation.
Formally, the following equation is estimated using volatility in production, sales, cash flow, and employment as dependent variables:
where the right-hand side variables are the same as in equation (2), with the exception of Bank Dependence and its interaction with the dummy for bank integration. It is worth stressing that our two measures of Bank Dependence-the one based on firm size and the one based on access to public debt markets-are constructed so that larger values of the variable reflect a heavier dependence on banking finance. If bank-dependent firms benefit more from interstate deregulation, we would expect  to have a negative sign.
This implies that volatility decreases after deregulation for those firms that rely more heavily on banks for their external financing needs.
In the empirical estimations, the size-based measure of bank dependence is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm's assets are below median assets in a given year and state. Panel B in Table II Table II , this group of firms accounts for 62.5 percent of firm-year observations.
D. Deregulation and the Cyclicality of Short-Term Borrowing
If bank lending availability is enhanced by deregulation, bank-dependent firms faced with idiosyncratic shocks would be able to borrow during periods of output contraction.
Hence, bank credit becomes less pro-cyclical and bank entry deregulation would lead to smaller firm volatility. The next step in our analysis is to test whether bank credit became less pro-cyclical for bank-dependent firms after bank entry deregulation. deregulation for the set of firms that most likely use bank credit. This would be evidence that bank entry deregulation reduced the pro-cyclicality of lending to bank-dependent firms.
E. Equity Return Volatility
In addition to real variables, we study the effect of deregulation on equity return volatility. A change in firms' volatility, both of production and profitability, would likely have an effect on stock returns. As shown by Pastor and Veronesi (2003), idiosyncratic return volatility increases with the volatility of profitability. This is particularly relevant for financially constrained firms. A decrease in the volatility of financially constrained firms after bank entry deregulation should also reduce stock return volatility. To test this hypothesis, we measure stock return volatility in our baseline specifications as the standard deviation of the residuals from the following market model estimated with monthly observations:
where R ijt is the return to shareholders of firm i in period t, which in our stock return regressions represents months instead of years. The market model in equation (5) is estimated for each firm before and after interstate entry deregulation, which allows for different coefficients in the two periods of interest.
We also estimate (5) adding the Fama-French size and value factors, and the JegadeeshTitman momentum factor. Lastly, we analyze raw excess returns computed as the residuals in (5), without controlling for the excess returns on the market portfolio.
We define idiosyncratic stock return volatility as the standard deviation of residuals in (5) for each firm and year. Figures 1 and 2 show the evolution of these residual returns before and after deregulation. Following banking deregulation, the median idiosyncratic component of stock return volatility declines for three years. Campbell et al. (2001) Figure 3 shows the evolution of median stock return volatility before and after deregulation splitting the sample by bank dependence. Compared to the group of firms with access to public debt markets, excess return volatility is higher for firms that are bank-dependent and experiences a steeper decline after banking deregulation. This evidence suggests that the stabilizing effects from banking deregulation may have benefited more those firms that depend to a greater extent on banks for their financing needs. The next section presents the statistical analysis behind this graphical evidence.
[ Figure 3] 
III. Results
A. Firm Volatility
In this section we analyze the effect of interstate bank entry deregulation on firm volatility. The focus is on variables that account for firm output and performance. Table   III presents the results of estimating equation (2) with the volatility of production, sales, cash flow, and employment as dependent variables. The coefficient on Integration is negative in all columns and statistically significant in the estimations for the volatility of cash flow and employment. To illustrate the economic magnitudes involved: after deregulation, the volatility of cash flow decreases by roughly 14 percent of the median volatility of cash flow in the sample. These results signal a sizeable decrease in volatility after out-of-state banks were permitted to enter local markets.
The findings in Table III also suggest that smaller and less profitable firms tend to be more volatile. Firm-specific volatility is not significantly correlated with state-level fluctuations. By contrast, industry-wide fluctuations appear to be an important component of firm volatility, as noted by the positive and significant coefficient on
Vol(Industry Sales).
The results in this section are consistent with those in Morgan, Rime, and Strahan (2004), who find a decrease in the volatility of the growth of state-level employment due to banking deregulation. This decrease in volatility is associated with bank geographical diversification, and, therefore, less vulnerability to state-specific shocks. In the following sections, we study the mechanism that triggers the reduction in volatility at the firm level.
But first we establish if bank-dependent firms are the ones that benefited the most from banking deregulation.
B. Firm Volatility and Bank Dependence
Small firms and firms without access to public debt markets are more likely to use bank credit to finance their operations. In the next set of tests, we compare the volatility of bank-dependent firms with the volatility of firms with access to other sources of finance, before and after the state deregulation of bank entry. These estimations allow us to control for changes in firm volatility within a state that are unrelated to decreases in out-of-state bank entry restrictions. Formally, we test whether volatility for bankdependent firms decreased by more after interstate banking deregulation. Table IV reports the results of estimating equation (3). In the regressions in Panel A, bank dependence is measured as lack of access to public debt markets, while, in Panel B, bank dependence is proxied by small firm size. 19 The coefficient on the interaction between bank dependence and the deregulation dummy is negative and significant in all specifications. This finding reflects the importance of deregulation on the observed decrease in volatility for the sample of bank-dependent firms. Bank deregulation makes bank-dependent firms more stable, but does not significantly alter the volatility of those firms that have ample access to non-bank sources of funding. The results in Table IV suggest that the effect of bank deregulation on firm volatility operates through direct relationship between firms and banks.
[ Table IV] The differential effect of deregulation on bank-dependent firms is substantial in most specifications, but it is particularly sizeable for cash-flow volatility. After deregulation, the reduction in the volatility of cash flow for small firms or for firms without access to public debt markets is about 27 percent relative to the median volatility of firm cash flow in the sample. The magnitude of the decrease in volatility of bank-dependent firms is somewhat smaller but still substantial when considering production, sales, and employment. As discussed by Booth and Cleary (2008) , firms with more volatile cash flows hold larger amounts of financial slack to finance their investment. Lower volatility of output and cash flow and better access to external finance should decrease the need for cash holdings and increase their profitability.
The results outlined in this section confirm the significant effect of bank entry deregulation on the volatility of bank-dependent firms. After checking the robustness of our main results to different specifications, sample restrictions, and controls in the next section, we will assess whether the reduction in firm volatility is explained by a decrease in the pro-cyclicality of bank credit.
C. Robustness Checks
This section tests the sensitivity of our basic results in equations (2) and (3) Results are very similar when we measure bank-dependence using a proxy related to firm size.
[ Table V Panel F includes all available firm-year observations, unlike our baseline regressions, which include only firms with non-missing observations two years before and two years after deregulation. The results in Panel F are very similar to our baseline results. Hence, our finding that bank-dependent firms become more stable after deregulation is dominated by the decrease in volatility for surviving firms, leaving only a relatively small role for differences in across firms that entered after deregulation and those that exited before deregulation.
Panels G and H expand the set of control variables of the baseline regressions. In
Panel G, we add a proxy for banking concentration to the right-hand side of equations (2) and (3). We measure banking concentration using the Herfindahl-Hirshman index of demand deposits by state. Panel H considers a larger set of firm-control variables. First, it includes leverage as measured by total debt scaled by assets. Second, it substitutes firm age, measured as time from IPO, for log sales. (Age and log-sales are not included simultaneously, as they are highly correlated.) The results from panel H suggest that the reduction in volatility after deregulation in previous sections is not explained by firms becoming more stable as they mature. Furthermore, in results not reported here, we estimate equations (2) and (3) replacing the actual banking deregulation dummy with a "placebo" deregulation dummy, constructed as an indicator that equals one starting two and four years after the actual deregulation took place in each state. We find that the effect of this "placebo" banking deregulation on the volatility of bank-dependent firms is not statistically significant.
The results summarized in Table V suggest that our main findings are robust to different volatility and deregulation measures, to alternative sample selection criteria, and to the inclusion of additional controls. In practically all regressions reported in Table V, the interaction between the interstate deregulation dummy and the bank dependence proxy is negative and significant. This evidence suggests that firms that are more likely to rely on bank credit tend to be more stable, on average, after interstate banking deregulation.
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D. Cyclicality of Short-Term Borrowing
In this section we explore the channel that leads to the decrease in real volatility for our sample of publicly-traded firms. As Larrain (2006) points out, lower volatility has to be accompanied by increased countercyclical borrowing. As banks become more geographically diversified through deregulation, the correlation between bank capital and economic growth at the state level decreases (Morgan, Rime, and Strahan (2004)).
Therefore, firms exploit bank credit to buffer from negative shocks.
We test the link between deregulation and firm volatility by checking the cyclicality of short-term borrowing. Table VI summarizes the results of estimating equation (4) using notes payable as the measure for short-term borrowing. Column (1) shows that notes payable is pro-cyclical on average. The coefficient on the interaction between the cyclicality variables and the deregulation dummy is negative but statistically insignificant. As expected, more profitable firms and with larger shares of tangible assets have higher borrowing growth rates.
[ Table VI] Columns (2) and (3) add proxies for bank dependence: public debt access and size. In both columns, the coefficient on the triple interaction between cyclicality, bankdependence, and deregulation is negative and significant. Hence, short-term borrowing for small firms becomes less pro-cyclical after deregulation. The same pattern is observed for firms that do not use bonds or commercial paper to finance their operation. 21 In other results not reported here, we replace for each state the actual deregulation date with a randomly generated date. The bank integration proxy and its interaction with the bank dependence measure become not significant.
This result is consistent with the decrease in the volatility of firm output and short-term credit described above. Geographically diversified banks are likely able to buffer firms from state-specific shocks by smoothing the credit they provide over the cycle.
E. Stock Return Volatility
In previous sections, we determined that output and cash flow volatility decreased after banking deregulation, especially for bank-dependent firms. This effect was accompanied by a reduction in the pro-cyclicality of credit. Based on our previous findings, we expect that lower volatility in real and financial variables after deregulation translates into less volatile stock returns. To test this hypothesis, we estimate the following equation:
where Vol(R ijt ) is the standard deviation of idiosyncratic returns as defined in Section II.B. Our focus is on  , the coefficient on the interaction between access to external finance and banking deregulation. Table VII presents (7) through (8) is derived by adding the size and value factors from Fama and French, and the momentum factor from Jegadeesh and Titman (1993).
[ Table VII] In columns (1), (4), and (7) the coefficient on the deregulation indicator is negative but not statistically significant. On average, the decrease in idiosyncratic return volatility is minimal. On the contrary, if we focus on bank-dependent firms, we find a considerable decrease in idiosyncratic return volatility after deregulation. These findings confirm the results in Pastor and Veronesi (2003) in a dynamic setting. As uncertainty about bankdependent firms' future profitability decreases due to better access to external financing, stock return volatility for these firms also declines. In sum, the financing environment has a significant effect on a firm's real and financial volatility.
IV. Conclusion
The empirical methodology of this paper exploits the staggered timing of state In our first set of results, we find that firms located in states that experienced interstate banking deregulation become more stable after deregulation. In particular, the growth rates of sales, production, cash flow, and employment become more stable for firms located in states that opened to interstate banking. Since the effect is stronger for those firms that depend on banks for external finance (because they are either small or have no credit ratings or issues), the stabilization is likely to be explained by the changes in the banking system induced by deregulation. When we exclude the proxies for bank dependence, the control group is the set of firms located in states that are yet to pass deregulation laws. When we include the proxies for bank dependence, we refine our control group to those firms that depend less on banks, because they can access external finance through public markets.
Our second set of results suggests that the stabilizing effects of banking deregulation are connected to the ability of firms to exploit credit to smooth out idiosyncratic shocks.
In particular, short-term credit becomes more countercyclical after deregulation. Firms may benefit from stability by smoothing investment when external financing is costly (Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) ), reducing expected costs of financial distress, and lowering expected tax liabilities (Smith and Stulz (1985) ). The concern for stability may be more pronounced for publicly traded firms, as Rountree, Weston, and Allayanis (2008) find that cash-flow volatility is negatively valued by investors.
In our third set of results, using a multifactor model of stock returns, we find that the idiosyncratic component of stock return volatility falls after deregulation. This finding suggests that the increased stability in operations (employment and production) and financial statements (cash flows) after deregulation translates into greater stock market stability. A reduction in idiosyncratic volatility may have an important impact on returns, because higher idiosyncratic volatility is associated with lower average returns (Ang et al. (2006a) and (2006b)).
Interpreting bank integration as a proxy for wider access to bank finance, the findings of this paper bridge two sets of results arguing that banking finance may have a stabilizing effect on the corporate sector. On the one hand, Larrain (2006) (2002)) occurred despite an increase in volatility for publicly-traded firms over the second half of the 20th century. 22 Our results do not run against the long-term increase in firm-level volatility documented by Campbell et al. (2001) , Comin and Philippon (2005) , and Comin and Mulani (2006) . In fact, the upward trend in volatility of those papers is temporarily halted or even reversed during the deregulation years we study in this paper. Our results do suggest, however, that the increase in firm volatility may have been steeper without interstate banking deregulation. In other words, firmlevel volatility has increased despite of-not because of-banking deregulation.
Naturally, the link between firm-level volatility and aggregate volatility deserves further attention.
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In our paper, the stabilizing effects of interstate banking deregulation were obtained starting from a situation where banking markets were highly fragmented across states. 23 This paper complements existing evidence on the link between financial markets and financial innovation, on the one hand, and volatility, on the other. In the case of the United States, for example, Dynan, Elmendorf, and Sichel (2006) argue that financial innovation may help explain the stabilization of economic activity in the mid 1980s. An interesting avenue for exploration consists of studying the interaction between banking deregulation and financial innovation (in the form of more efficient pricing of risk, for example). 24 See, for example, Acemoglu et al. (2003) . Theory and evidence, Working paper, CEPR. Significance: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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